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We examine the internal market for department chairs in U.S. universities and provide 
the first empirical evidence concerning the determinants of departmental chair service 
using data from the economics departments in eight large public universities. The results 
reveal the wage premium for chairs increases with length of service and continues for an 
extended period thereafter. The chair premium largely represents compensation for 
foregone research and the attendant atrophy of research skills. The empirical results also 
indicate that departments tend to choose productive scholars to serve as chair, but avoid 
putting their most productive scholars in that position unless they are past their peak 








Although a large number of academics serve as department chairs or in similar 
administrative posts during their careers, many do not. And for most of those who do, 
their terms as chair are typically temporary rather than a permanent step into academic 
administration. In light of these observations, questions arise: Which faculty members are 
willing to serve as chair and, from among those individuals, whom do departments 
choose? In particular, do departments minimize the opportunity cost of filling the chair 
position, or are there other forces at work? These questions lie at the heart of 
understanding the internal markets for department chairs.  
In private firms an administrative appointment is generally the result of superior 
performance and is often only one of a series of promotions during the individual’s 
career. If successful with the new duties, the individual will likely never return to his or 
her original position, but will instead rise in the firm’s administrative ladder or elsewhere. 
In contrast, the department chair position plays a different role in the career of university 
faculty. Although the chair position may be a stepping-stone to other administrative posts 
for some individuals, for most it is not a promotion per se. Instead, it is a period during 
which the individual’s duties shift from teaching and research to administrative functions. 
When the term is completed, though, even the most successful chair often returns to his 
or her role as a regular member of the department faculty. Given this difference, it is 
perhaps not surprising that the incentives and career ladder models used to explain 
promotion policies of private firms appear to provide little to explain the periods of 
service as department chair.  
1 We examine the factors affecting whether or not an individual ultimately serves as 
department chair and offer the first empirical study of how the internal (to the 
department) market for chairs operates, using data from the economics departments in 
several large public universities. 
The existing literature focuses on how serving as a chair affects salary or research 
productivity (Katz, 1978; Seigfried and White, 1973; Saks, 1977; Tuchman and Leahey, 
1975; Hammermesh et al., 1984; Sauer, 1988; Goodman and Sauer, 1995; Ragan and 
Rehman, 1996). The empirical consensus is that serving as department chair reduces 
research productivity during the term of service as well as permanently thereafter. 
Serving as department chair also generates a salary differential for the duration of the 
term that lingers long after the individual has left the position. These results are 
consistent with the notion that the chair’s salary increment is at least in part a 
compensating differential for foregone contemporaneous and future research 
productivity. However, this important conclusion does not provide a sufficiently 
complete model of the internal department chair market.  
When considering how departments choose their chairs, it is tempting to focus on 
idiosyncratic features of specific individuals and universities. For example, a department 
in a university that has recently undergone a complete change in upper administration is 
likely to be buffeted by forces that are often temporary, subsiding once the new 
administration is firmly ensconced. In order to minimize the influence of such passing 
idiosyncratic factors that can obscure the fundamental economic forces at work in the 
internal market for department chairs, our data set covers a cross section of economics 
departments in eight large public universities. Furthermore, by focusing on economics 
2 departments alone, we avoid the difficulties associated with measuring research 
productivity and opportunity costs across disciplines.  
The economics departments in our sample emphasize research as an important 
component in their overall missions. Our hypothesis is that, although these departments 
may want an experienced researcher as chair, they will also try to staff the position at the 
lowest opportunity cost. We consider two components of cost minimizing behavior, 
comparative advantage and life-cycle effects. The former is the notion that departments 
prefer relatively less productive individuals as chairs. The latter is the notion that 
departments prefer to draw their chairs from faculty who are past their peak publishing 
phase in the typical life cycle.  
Finally, we also consider “the luck of the draw” as an alternative explanation. 
This view simply maintains that being called on to serve as a department chair is much 
like being called on for jury duty - a more or less random event.  
The discussion is organized as follows. Section II describes the model of the 
internal market for department chairs. Section III examines how serving as chair affects 
faculty salary, both during the term of duty and after. Section IV examines the factors 
that influence the choice of chair, and Section V concludes. 
II. The Internal Market for Department Chair  
Economists should carry their professional focus on resource allocation questions over 
into departmental policy decisions, so economics departments should consider 
opportunity costs in making decisions.
1 Still, personalities and the institutional decision 
process can affect observed outcomes; the empirical question is whether or not these 
factors significantly affect the faculty’s ability to staff its chair at minimum cost. The 
3 inability of a committee or group of individuals to behave as if they have well-defined 
preferences is well documented.
2 The problem is further complicated by the fact that 
choosing a chair typically involves more than garnering a simple majority of department 
faculty votes. The input of deans or other external agents in the decision can create 
agenda control or other structure-induced equilibrium effects.  
Nonetheless, it is not clear that higher levels of university administration will 
necessarily drive the department’s choice away from the lowest opportunity cost solution. 
The salary analysis in the next section shows that chair’s pay is largely a compensating 
differential for the individual’s foregone research. Thus, higher-level administration 
interested in filling departmental administrative posts at the lowest salary cost would in 
effect support the lowest opportunity cost choice.  
Finally, we also note that the influence of interest groups in the group decision 
process also need not negate a tendency for departments to minimize costs. In general, we 
expect that individual faculty prefer chair candidates who support a specific agenda; the 
candidate with the greatest political support in the department is the one who best 
represents the dominant interest group. Within our model the pivotal interest group would 
also offer, from within its acceptable set of individuals, a candidate representing the 
lowest opportunity cost to the department.  
III. Chair Service and Salary  
This section examines the relative rewards to serving as department chair and how the 
structure of the rewards during and following the term of office affect research 
productivity. Previous studies have estimated the earnings premium associated with 
service as a chair and virtually all find a significant positive premium - somewhere 
4 between 15 and 30 percent (Siegfried and White, 1973; Ferber, 1974; Tuckman and 
Leahey, 1975) - although Katz (1978) finds no significant premium. Saks (1977) and 
Ragan and Rehman (1996) provide evidence on the durability of this premium after an 
individual steps down. Though their data and approaches differ considerably from that 
herein, both conclude that the chair premium erodes slowly over time.  
The Data and Variable Definitions. Our personal characteristics and productivity 
data are constructed using information drawn from the complete set of individual vitae of 
full-time, tenure-track faculty members in Ph.D. granting economics departments in the 
U.S.
3 Salary information is constructed from the university budgets, which were readily 
available for all of the public universities in the data set.  
The vitae are complete through the 1992-1993 academic year. An individual’s 
vita permits us to construct variables that measure cumulative career productivity as of 
1993, and variables measuring productivity at particular points along the experience-
productivity profile. Our sample consists of eighty-seven associate and full professors. 
There are 27 faculty members with former or current experience as chair. Assistant 
professors were excluded because none had served as chair.   
The economics departments are similar in that they are all in public universities 
and all house Ph.D. programs. According to the rankings reported in Scott and Mitias 
(1996), the departments in our data set rank between thirtieth and seventy-fifth in the 
U.S.
4 We expect that these departments have broadly similar research, teaching, and 
service missions. Consistent with this expectation, a comparison of faculty at these 
departments reveals similar demographic characteristics and publication records.  
5 Professional Experience measures the number of years of post-Ph.D. academic 
job experience. Seniority is the number of years employed at the current institution in a 
permanent tenure-track position. Sex is a dummy variable taking a value of one for males. 
Foreign  is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual received his or her 
undergraduate degree from a non-English-speaking country. Pedigree Ph.D. is a dummy 
variable indicating whether the individual earned his or her Ph.D. at one of the top 
graduate programs in economics in the U.S. A number of economics graduate programs 
rankings exist, based on opinion surveys as well as departmental publications (Moore, 
1972; Siegfried, 1972; Bell and Seater, 1978; Graves et al., 1982; Hogan, 1986; Scott and 
Mitias, 1996). We identify the top programs as only those that were highly ranked in 
virtually all of these studies: Chicago, Harvard, M.I.T., Michigan, Minnesota, 
Northwestern, Pennsylvania, Princeton, Stanford, Berkeley, UCLA, Wisconsin, and 
Yale.
5   
Our measures of individual research productivity attempt to control for both 
quality and quantity. We stratify each individual’s publications across tiers of economics 
journals, representing a broadly defined but meaningful index of research quality. The 
top-tier journals comprise, in alphabetical order, the American Economic Review, 
Econometrica, Economic Journal, Economica, International Economic Review, Journal 
of Economic Theory, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Review of Economic Studies, and the Review of Economics and Statistics. There is no 
unanimous agreement in the economics profession concerning which journals represent 
the top-tier. Our list of top 10 journals includes the top 8 identified by Conroy et al. 
(1995) plus the Economic Journal and Economica. This list contains the most significant 
6 journals for our sample. Although the reputations of several of the journals in our top-tier 
may have slipped in recent years, they are clearly relevant for the senior faculty in our 
sample who published in them before they lost prestige in the profession. 
  We also identify second-tier journals as widely recognized second-tier general 
interest journals and the best field journals. We used the adjusted citation rankings in 
Liebowitz and Palmer (1984) to guide our choice of journals. We also relied upon the 
recent department quality ranking by Scott and Mitias (1996) to help identify some newer 
field journals appropriate for this set. The Appendix lists the 45 second-tier journals.  
 The  variable  Total Publications is the broadest measure of research productivity. 
It is the sum of all books and journal articles listed on an individual’s vita. Citations 
measures the total citations to an individual’s published work as reported in the Social 
Science Citation Index. This measure includes all co-authored citations regardless of 
listed order of authors. Teaching Award is a dummy variable included in the salary 
equation as a proxy for teaching quality. The variable takes a value of one if the 
individual has ever won a teaching award. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the faculty in our sample. The full 
professors in our sample have an average of almost 22 years experience since earning 
their Ph.D.s. With an average of 16 years seniority, they have spent about 75 percent of 
their careers at their current university. Six percent earned their undergraduate degrees in 
non-English-speaking countries, and 41 percent obtained their Ph.D.s from the top-tier 
programs.  
The associate professors have about 14 years of experience on average, with 12 
years at their current institution. Twelve percent earned their undergraduate degrees in 
7 non-English-speaking countries - over twice the percentage of full professors - and 44 
percent obtained their Ph.D.s from the top-tier programs.  
All of the departments in our sample emphasize publications, so it is not 
surprising that many of the faculty publish regularly. Although the faculty in the sample 
publish in journals at all levels, they publish fewer papers in the top-tier journals than in 
lower level journals. On average, both full and associate professors tend to publish most 
heavily in journals outside the sets of journals identified as level-one and two herein and 
publish more articles in level-two journals than in level-one journals. Still, 76 percent of 
the individuals in the sample have published in the top-tier journals, and 92 percent have 
published in second-tier journals. The average number of career citations is 147, although 
two individuals have garnered over 1,000 citations each.  
The Salary Model. Our salary equation modifies the usual reduced form hedonic 
framework in order to focus on how serving as chair affects faculty salaries. The 
dependent variable is the log of the 1992-1993 nine-month salary, excluding consulting 
or royalty income or other outside income. The explanatory variables include the 
individual characteristics and productivity measures typical of academic salary models 
(Moore et al., 1998).  
  The basic version of the salary equation is reported in Table 2. The signs and 
significance of the coefficients on the individual characteristics and productivity variables 
follow those found elsewhere. Of particular interest for this study, the coefficients for 
Total Publications,  Level I Articles, and Level II Articles clearly reveal that the 
departments in our sample value published research and reward higher quality research 
(at least as indicated by higher ranked journals) more than lower quality research. These 
8 departments value articles in level-one journals almost twice as much as articles in level-
two journals. 
The Chair Premium. We include Years as Chair in the salary equation to capture 
the earnings differential attributable to an individual’s accumulated experience as chair. 
We define this variable as the number of years an individual has served as a department 
chair, either currently or in the past.  
  The earnings equation in Table 2 reveals a positive and significant return to 
experience as chairperson. Chairs in our sample receive somewhat less than two percent 
premium for each year of service. Under this specification, the payoff to a chairperson 
with the sample average of 5.63 years of chair experience is about 9.7 percent.  
How Durable Is the Chair Premium?  While our chair premium estimate is 
broadly consistent with previous studies, it is still not entirely clear what kinds of 
productivity effects are being rewarded. A chairperson might be rewarded for enhancing 
the teaching and research productivity of other faculty members by creating a conducive 
environment or by successfully obtaining additional resources for the department. 
Another possibility is that any positive rewards paid to chairpersons may also reflect 
purely compensating wage payments (combat pay) for performing a difficult or 
dissatisfying job. To the extent that the observed chair premium is due to one of these 
two hypotheses, it should not increase with each additional year of chair experience, and 
it should last only as long as the individual remains in that position. 
  On the other hand, Goodwin and Sauer (1995) show that an individual’s research 
productivity falls precipitously during, and particularly after, a term as department chair. 
Therefore, an alternative possibility is that the chair premium is the payment necessary to 
9 offset the high opportunity cost of forgone research time and the attendant atrophy of 
research skills while in office. If so, the chair premium should rise with the length of the 
term served and persist for a significant period of time after the individual leaves the 
position; without the persistent salary premium, productive scholars could not be 
attracted to serve as department chair. 
  These arguments suggest that the way in which both cumulative length of term 
and the pattern of lagged effects are reflected in the individual’s salary can reveal the 
driving force behind the chair premium. A premium that does not increase with the length 
of term and rapidly diminishes after leaving office is consistent with the notion that the 
chair premium is a direct reward for administrative duties or is combat pay. Alternatively, 
a premium that increases with length of term as chair coupled with persistence after 
relinquishing the department chair is consistent with the notion that the premium is 
primarily compensation for the opportunity cost of foregone research and the atrophy of 
research skills.  
To estimate the rate at which the chair premium dissipates after an individual 
leaves office, the model in Table 3 extends the base earnings equation to include Years 
Since Leaving, the number of years since an individual last served as chair: Years Since 
Leaving = (93 - Year last served). This variable equals zero for both current chairpersons 
and those who have never served as chair. The coefficient on this variable (and its square, 
in the quadratic specification) reflects the rate of decay in the chair premium once the 
individual relinquishes the position. 
  Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients for the base salary model in Table 2 
plus the expanded set of chair experience variables. We include the square of Years Since 
10 Leaving under the assumption that the dissipation profile for a former chairperson’s 
premium may be nonlinear.  
Based on these estimates, chairs receive a 2.7 percent premium for each year of 
service while in that position. Thus, the payoff for serving the sample average of 5.63 
years is about 15.2 percent - an estimate that is substantially higher than found in Table 2, 
but within the range of estimates found in previous studies. More importantly, though, the 
estimates reveal that the accumulated premium associated with chair experience 
dissipates rather slowly after leaving office and at a decreasing rate over time. Overall, 
the observed pattern is for the salary differential associated with service as chair to rise 
with time in office and then to decay over time following resignation.
6 The decay profile 
is convex. An estimated ten years pass before the accumulated chair premium has been 
fully dissipated.  
The pattern of returns found in our sample suggests that the chair premium 
represents compensation for lost research productivity rather than compensation for 
simply undertaking an onerous task. Whatever the driving force behind the premium, 
however, the full return to chair service includes not only the premium earned while in 
office, but also the lingering premium that continues after leaving office. 
IV. The Choice of Department Chair  
The estimated salary equations reveal that, as expected, the departments in our sample 
value published research and pay chairs a premium as compensation for lost research 
opportunities. Thus a budget-conscious university administration would tend to reinforce 
any faculty tendency to choose chairs with lower opportunity costs. This section uses a 
reduced form probit model to examine the empirical determinants of serving as 
11 department chair and, in particular, the competing cost-minimization and jury-duty 
hypotheses.  
The dependent variable in the empirical models is Chair, a binary variable that 
takes the value of one for faculty who have served (or are currently serving) as chair 
some time during their career. The explanatory variables include the individual 
characteristics and productivity measures introduced earlier as well as other variables to 
test the cost-minimization hypotheses, as explained below.  
  None of the female faculty in our sample served as department chair, so we do not 
include a gender dummy variable in the model. We have no expectations concerning how 
the dummy variables Foreign and Pedigree PhD affect the likelihood of chair service. 
They are nonetheless included in the model. 
  Other individual characteristics include Experience  and  Seniority.  Our cost-
minimization or jury-duty hypotheses predicts that there should be no significant 
relationship between the experience variable and chair service when controlling for 
relative productivity effects measured across individuals and within each individual’s 
life-cycle. Under the jury-duty hypothesis, however, simply serving a greater number of 
years on the faculty of a single university increases the cumulative probability of chair 
service. Therefore the jury-duty hypothesis calls for a significantly positive coefficient on 
seniority when controlling for productivity effects.  
 The  variable  Citations is included as a research quality control. Testing the cost-
minimization hypothesis, however, requires measuring relative research productivity 
while controlling for both quality and quantity of publications. To construct such 
12 measures, we stratify each individual’s publications across the tiers of economics journals 
identified in the previous section.  
  Recall that the cost-minimization hypothesis comprises two components. The first 
rests on comparative advantage. That is, departments tend to choose faculty who are 
relatively less productive in publishing than their colleagues. To test this hypothesis we 
construct quality-adjusted measures of individual faculty relative to their department 
colleagues. For individuals who are serving or have served as department chairs, the 
relative productivity variables Relative Level I and Relative Level II are defined as the 
individual’s average number of publications in the top-tier or second-tier journals, 
respectively, at the time of chair appointment, relative to the department average for the 
full professors in the sample. For individuals who are not or have not been chairs, the two 
variables Relative Level I and Relative Level II measure the individual’s productivity to 
date in top-tier and second-tier journals, respectively, relative to the department average.  
Negative coefficients imply that chairs are selected from among the relatively less 
productive department members - the cost-minimization hypothesis based on 
comparative advantage.  
  The second cost-minimization argument rests on life-cycle effects; departments 
tend to choose as chairs faculty who are beyond their peak research productivity years. 
To test this hypothesis, we construct quality-adjusted measures of an individual’s life-
cycle productivity. For an individual who has chair experience in our sample, we define 
Life-Cycle I as the level-one publication rate during the five years immediately preceding 
the term as chair, relative to the annual productivity rate over his career (up to the 
appointment to chair). For an individual who has never served as a department chair, we 
13 define Life-Cycle I as the level-one publication rate during the most recent five years, 
relative to the annual productivity rate over his career to date. The variable Life-Cycle II 
is similarly defined for level-two publications. Given the typical life-cycle pattern of 
increasing then declining publication rates (Goodwin and Sauer, 1995), a negative 
coefficient implies that departments tend to choose their chairs from the faculty who are 
past the peak years of research productivity in their life-cycle. 
  Table 4 reports the probit estimates for the chair determinants model. The 
Experience, Experience
2, Pedigree PhD, and Foreign coefficients are not significant. The 
coefficient estimates for the variables of central interest, however, are significantly 
different from zero.  
 The  Relative Level I coefficient is significantly negative while the Relative Level 
II coefficient is significantly positive. The former implies that those individuals who 
publish relatively more heavily in level-one journals are less likely to serve while the 
latter implies that those who are relatively more productive publishing in level-two 
journals are more likely to serve as chair. Together, this pattern reveals an interesting 
twist on our cost-minimization hypothesis. As indicated in the salary equations reported 
in Table 2, the departments in our sample value level-one journal articles highly, almost 
twice as much as level-two articles. These departments tend to avoid putting their most 
productive level-one researchers into the chair position.
7  At the same time, while level-
two articles are valued, these departments are more willing to put their more productive 
level-two publishers into the chair position. This pattern of coefficients is consistent with 
the comparative-advantage version of the cost-minimization hypothesis, somewhat 
mediated by dominant interest group affects. Departments pick relatively more 
14 productive scholars as chair, but not the most highly prized scholars. Since the 
departments in our sample all share a research focus, putting productive researchers into 
the chair position is consistent with what we would expect to be the dominant interest 
group; a productive scholar has revealed that he or she values research and is therefore 
likely to pursue policies that support the department’s research mission. At the same 
time, though, these departments avoid having their most highly prized research scholars -
those publishing relatively more level-one papers – serve as chair. While faculty value a 
chair who excels in research, they apparently attempt to avoid incurring too high of an 
opportunity cost; giving up level-two journal articles is costly, but not as costly as giving 
up the relatively more scarce level-one articles.  
  We see a similar pattern in the coefficients of Life-Cycle I and Life-Cycle II. The 
significantly negative Life-Cycle I coefficient implies that individuals are less likely to 
serve as department chair before reaching the diminishing portion of their level-one 
research productivity profile. The significantly positive Life-Cycle II coefficient, on the 
other hand, suggests that individuals who have not yet reached the diminishing portion of 
their level-two research productivity profile are more likely to serve as department chair. 
The  Life-Cycle I estimate is clearly consistent with the life-cycle-cost-minimization 
hypothesis. At first glance, however, the Life-Cycle II coefficient estimate appears to be 
inconsistent with cost minimization. All other things equal, we expect that departments 
tend to select chairs from faculty who have reached the downside of their life-cycle 
productivity in terms of level-two journal articles. On the other hand, this pattern is 
consistent with a dominant interest group effect to the extent that research faculty prefer 
chairs who are actively engaged in research when appointed. But again, the level-one 
15 coefficient indicates that they are unwilling to incur a higher opportunity cost than 
necessary to get a currently productive scholar to fill the chair position. 
  These coefficient patterns help explain the significantly positive effect of 
Citations on serving as chair. Consistent with the variables associated with publications 
in level-two journals, departments prefer individuals with a record of quality publications 
(as reflected in a greater number of citations). But again, the negative coefficients on the 
level-one journal publications variables indicate the avoidance of high opportunity cost. 
  Finally, if the relative and life cycle productivity variables had been 
insignificantly different from zero, the positive Seniority coefficient would be consistent 
with the jury-duty hypothesis; chair service is simply the luck of the draw. The 
significant productivity variables, however, rule out the jury-duty hypothesis. Coupled 
with those results, the positive seniority effect implies that the departments in our sample 
tend to recruit department chairs from faculty who have been in the department longer 
rather than selecting from the more recent arrivals. Simply put, these departments have 
not had a penchant for recruiting externally for their chairs. In our sample, we are aware 
of only one individual who was hired externally to serve as chair.  
V. Conclusion 
We examine the internal market for department chairs. Instead of serving as a stepping 
stone to higher administrative positions, many faculty regard service as chair as a 
temporary shift in their duties away from teaching and research to administrative 
functions. Taking over the chair duties, however, not only reduces research productivity 
during the term, but it also has deleterious effects on the individual’s research profile 
thereafter. For research-oriented departments, then, the choice of a productive faculty 
16 member for chair implies both an immediate and an enduring opportunity cost. Our 
hypothesis is that economics departments choose from among the set of likely candidates 
those with a lower opportunity cost. 
We use data from eight Ph.D. economics departments in public universities to test 
this cost-minimization hypothesis. At these eight programs there are a total of 27 current 
and former chairpersons. For each of these observations we are able to construct detailed 
productivity measures for the periods prior to, during, and subsequent to their tenure as 
chair. We conclude that the departments in our sample tend to select chairs from among 
their relatively more productive faculty, but avoid choosing the most productive faculty.  
Furthermore, there is some evidence that when the most productive faculty do serve 
terms as chair, they tend to serve when they are entering the declining portion of their 
research life cycle. Overall, these economics departments apparently prefer currently 
productive scholars as chairs, but this preference is balanced by a desire to fill the 
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Note: Standard deviation in parentheses.  
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Notes: Dependent variable is log of 9-month salary. Department dummy variables are included but not 
reported. * Significant at the .05 level. 
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Notes: Also included in the regression are the other variables listed in Table 2.  * Significant at the .01 
level. 
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Probit Estimates for Department Chair Determinants 
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Note:  * Significant at the .01 level. 
24   APPENDIX - Level II Journals 
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12.  Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 
13.  Journal of Comparative Economics 
14.  Journal of Econometrics 
15.  Journal of Economics Dynamics and Control 
16.  Journal of Economic History 
17.  Journal of Economic Literature 
18.  Journal of Economics and Organization 
19.  Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
20.  Journal of Finance 
21.  Journal of Financial Economics 
22.  Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 
23.  Journal of Health Economics 
24.  Journal of Human Resources 
25.  Journal of Industrial Economics 
26.  Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 
27.  Journal of International Money and Finance 
28.  Journal of International Economics 
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31.  Journal of Legal Studies 
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1 And, similary, if economics departments do not behave as if they minimize costs when 
filling chair positions, it is reasonable to infer that other departments do not behave that 
way, too. 
 
2 For example, Plott (1967). Interestingly, though, the public choice literature reveals that 
even complex group decision environments may in practice generate outcomes that can 
be rationalized by a well behaved preference structure (Turnbull and Chang, 1998). 
 
3 Vitae were supplied by members of these departments in response to personal requests 
on the condition that the identity of the departments remain confidential. The data set 
includes only those departments for which complete vitae could be obtained for all 
faculty. Earlier work by Moore et al. (1998) uses nine public universities, which includes 
the eight in our data set herein. The ninth university could not be used because the vita of 
its single faculty member with department chair experience did not contain all of the 
information needed for this study. 
 
4 The range of schools running from thirtieth to seventy-fifth is not as wide a range as it 
may first appear. Scott and Mitias (1996) show that the difference in publication 
performance between the thirtieth and seventy-fifth ranked departments is extremely 
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small when compared with, for example, the difference between the tenth and thirtieth 
ranked departments. 
 
5 Our results were unaffected using a smaller set including only Chicago, Harvard, MIT, 
Yale, Pennsylvania, and Stanford. 
 
6 Although our empirical specification is different, these results are very similar to those 
reported by Saks (1977) for department chairs at Michigan State University. We also 
estimated the model using Saks’ specification. Since the results are qualitatively similar, 
we opt for the more straight-forward quadratic specification. 
 
7 Alternatively, perhaps these individuals may be unwilling to serve because rewards to 
continuing level-one publications may outweigh chair returns. 
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